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Abstract 
According to Michael King, Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies may be “the most 
influential book ever to come out of New Zealand.” Written in Christchurch in the last years 
of the Second World War by a Jewish intellectual in exile from Vienna, the book’s forthright 
attack on Plato created a storm of controversy worldwide, and continues to be influential today. 
In this piece, I want to reintroduce Popper to the current generation of New Zealanders. I look 
at how the book came to be written in New Zealand, and what Popper thought of the country. 
I also examine the controversy surrounding the book, and see what we might say about it today, 
especially in light of subsequent scholarship.  
 
 
“Just before his death Plato saw in a dream that he became a swan and, leaping from 
tree to tree, he frustrated the attempts of the bird-catchers to hunt him down.” 
Olympiodorus, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy.2  
 
“The Platonic ‘Socrates’ of the Republic is the embodiment of an unmitigated 
authoritarianism.” Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies.3  
 
 
Introduction 
In the last year of the Second World War, a little-known philosopher called Karl Popper 
published a work entitled The Open Society and its Enemies in two volumes, the first subtitled 
The Spell of Plato, and the second focusing on Hegel and Marx.4 It quickly earned praise from 
leading academics. In the journal Mind, Gilbert Ryle, the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical 
Philosophy at the University of Oxford, declared:  
This is a powerful and important book. . . . Dr. Popper writes with extreme clarity and 
vigour. His studies in Greek history and Greek thought have obviously been profound 
and original. Platonic exegesis will never be the same again.5 
 
No less a figure than Bertrand Russell (who had recently returned from America to his 
fellowship at Trinity College, Cambridge) agreed. Popper’s book was, in fact, 
a work of first-class importance which ought to be widely read for its masterly 
criticism of the enemies of democracy, ancient and modern. His attack on Plato, while 
inorthodox (sic), is to my mind thoroughly justified. . . . The book is a vigorous and 
profound defence of democracy, timely, very interesting, and very well written.6 
 
Not all of the attention that Popper’s book attracted was admiring, however. In 1950, the 
formidable Chicago scholar Leo Strauss wrote to his associate Eric Voegelin, asking him to 
“let me know sometime what you think about Mr. Popper.”7 Voegelin did not hold back:  
[Popper] is not able even approximately to reproduce correctly the contents of one 
page of Plato. Reading is of no use to him; he is too lacking in knowledge to 
understand what the author says. . . . Briefly and in sum: Popper’s book is a scandal 
without extenuating circumstances; in its intellectual attitude it is the typical product 
of a failed intellectual; spiritually one would have to use expressions like rascally, 
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impertinent, loutish; in terms of technical competence, as a piece in the history of 
thought, it is dilettantish, and as a result is worthless.8 
 
Though Voegelin’s letter does seem to have stopped Popper from receiving an appointment at 
the University of Chicago, it could not prevent Popper’s book from being widely influential.9 
By 2003, Michael King could write in his Penguin History that The Open Society “may well 
be most influential book ever to come out of New Zealand.”10  
 
The influence of Popper’s book, though, is of a peculiar sort. For a work on the history of 
philosophy, it has had an unusually strong effect on the real world of politics. The size of this 
effect would be difficult to measure, of course; what can be said for sure is that the book has 
been claimed as an influence by democratic reformers from East Germany, through the Middle 
East, to the Far East (and indeed, its name lives on in the Open Society Institute of Popper’s 
student George Soros).11 At the same time, the reception of Popper’s Open Society in the 
academic world is still somewhat mixed. Though assessments of his work continue to be 
published, criticisms by political theorists are not in short supply. 12  Among professional 
classicists and ancient philosophers, the criticism has sometimes verged on dismissiveness.13 
One celebrated ancient historian, Josiah Ober, at the beginning of a chapter on Plato’s thought, 
quickly dispenses of both Popper and Strauss at once:  
While each of these approaches has enjoyed considerable popularity in certain circles, 
neither Popper’s nor Strauss’s view is widely accepted, or even much noticed, by the 
bulk of modern Plato scholarship, written by academic philosophers. Historians might 
like to suppose that Popper and Strauss are generally ignored because their views are 
demonstrably wrong on historical grounds: Popper’s position on Plato-as-reactionary 
was predicated on now-discredited images of early Greek society as overtly “tribal” 
and fourth-century Athens as characterized by decline and decay.14  
 
If I may be allowed an anecdote, I will add that the mixed nature of Popper’s reputation was 
made clear to me only a few weeks before I myself moved to New Zealand, at a dinner 
following an interdisciplinary seminar on ancient political thought at Stanford. When I 
mentioned my impending move, the conversation soon turned to New Zealand classicists and 
philosophers, and in this context the name of Karl Popper was one of the first to come up. Very 
soon the dinner table was divided: though everyone had heard of Popper, only the political 
scientists in attendance showed unguarded interest; the classicists were unenthusiastic, and the 
ancient philosophers (both of them Platonists) were openly hostile. The only person actually to 
praise Popper was an exchange student from China, who was actively engaged in his country’s 
prodemocracy movement and lauded Popper’s insistence that our future is ours for the making.  
 
In this paper, I want first to reintroduce New Zealanders to Karl Popper, perhaps as someone 
that they might claim as one of their own. This will involve going over the conditions that led 
to his arrival in this country, and surveying some of his opinions about the place. I also want 
to go back to the controversy that The Open Society caused in the years following its 
publication, and see what we might say about this controversy today. Since I am first a historian 
of ancient Greece, and secondly a classicist, I will focus mainly on Popper’s depiction of 
ancient Athenian society, and on his extraordinary attack on Plato. With all that we have 
learned about both topics in the seventy years since the publication of Popper’s book, and with 
the wisdom of hindsight, what can we say about the fairness of Popper’s polemic? And what 
can we say about its impact? Answering these questions will involve detours into discussions 
about how we should read Platonic texts, and about the various gradations of authoritarianism 
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and totalitarianism. I will end this essay by asking what Popper might have missed, and what 
those of us who are inspired by his idea of the open society might want to turn our efforts to 
today. 
 
 
1. The Open Society: Composition, Reception, Context, and Flaws 
Karl Raimund Popper was born into a Jewish family in Vienna in 1902. His father, a lawyer 
and book collector, had earned a doctorate in law at the University of Vienna, and by 1928 
Karl had earned his own doctorate, in psychology. In 1934, while teaching mathematics and 
physics at a secondary school, Popper was able to publish his first book, Logik der Forschung 
(or The Logic of Scientific Discovery, though it would not be translated into English for twenty-
five years).15 This work, which lays the groundwork for the philosophy of science which was 
to be Popper’s major achievement, was published with the aid of the Vienna Circle, a group of 
philosophers dedicated to logical positivism.16 The book made Popper’s name, if only within 
the esoteric world of the philosophy of logic and mathematics. It also led to his appointment 
as Lecturer in Philosophy at what was then Canterbury University College of the University of 
New Zealand in Christchurch. Popper arrived there in March 1937, a year before the absorption 
of Austria into the Third Reich; Kristallnacht, during which almost a hundred synagogues were 
destroyed in Vienna alone, followed on 9 November, 1938.17 
 
By that point, Popper and his wife Hennie were far removed, at least geographically, from the 
horrors of Nazi rule. Indeed, as Popper would later write, New Zealand was “not quite the 
moon, but after the moon . . . the farthest place in the world”; it was, at any rate, “infinitely 
remote” from Europe:  
In those days New Zealand had no contact with the world except through England, 
five weeks away. There was no air connection and one could not expect an answer to 
a letter in less than three months. . . . It was a wonderfully quiet and pleasant 
atmosphere for work, and I settled down quickly.18   
 
Popper’s 1974 autobiography, Unended Quest, from which many of these quotations are taken, 
provides ample evidence that the philosopher, in his older years, remembered his time in New 
Zealand with some fondness. As he recalls: 
There was no harm in the people: like the British they were decent, friendly, and well 
disposed . . . I had the impression that New Zealand was the best-governed country in 
the world, and the most easily governed. . . . I liked New Zealand very much . . . and 
I was ready to stay there for good.19 
 
But despite this assertion, by 1945 Popper was preparing to leave New Zealand for good.20 He 
wrote to E. H. Gombrich: 
Dear Ernst, This time we are really off, I think. We have been allotted berths—in two 
different four-berth cabins, though—on the M.V. “New Zealand Star.” . . . It is a 
frighter (sic), Blue Star Line, carrying normally 12 passengers, and at present (in the 
same cabins) 30. We are not terribly pleased to pay 320 pounds for the pleasure of 
spending 5 or 6 very rough weeks in the company of strangers. . . . The passage will 
be very rough since we sail via Cape Horn—perhaps the roughest spot in the Seven 
Seas. Our corpses are expected to arrive, by the New Zealand Star, on January 8 th or 
thereabouts. Please receive them kindly.21 
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What lay behind this decision to leave New Zealand after all? The most important factor in 
Popper’s departure was, of course, F. A. Hayek’s offer of a Readership at the London School 
of Economics. “From that moment,” writes Popper in Unended Quest, “I was impatient to leave 
New Zealand.”22 But we can also find increasing signs of increasing irritability and ill health 
in the many letters that Popper wrote to Gombrich while he was in New Zealand. In that 
apparent deterioration in the philosopher’s well-being, there were probably two main factors. 
The first is the heavy emotional commitment that Popper brought to the writing of the Open 
Society. Like his friend Gombrich (also Viennese and Jewish), Popper was profoundly affected 
by the narrowness of his escape from the Nazis. It is this that lies behind what has struck many 
subsequent readers as the excessively, almost inexplicably, polemical tone of Popper’s critique 
of Plato.23 As Popper explains in the preface to the second edition, written in 1950, 
Although much of what is contained in this book took shape at an earlier date, the 
final decision to write it was made in March 1938, on the day I received news of the 
invasion of Austria. The writing extended into 1943; and the fact that most of the book 
was written during the grave years when the outcome of the war was uncertain may 
help to explain why some of its criticism strikes me to-day as more emotional and 
harsher in tone than I could wish. But it was not the time to mince words—at least, 
this was what I then felt.24  
 
The second reason for Popper’s worsening spirits and health is a more pragmatic one. The 
Open Society, perhaps like all great books, was an almighty struggle to produce and publish. 
The Poppers grew vegetables to supplement Karl’s salary, which, as Hennie wrote in a letter 
to Gombrich, “is never quite sufficient.”25 During what Hennie came to call “the nightmare 
years,” Popper would give his wife handwritten drafts, which she would then type and retype.26 
Even after the manuscript had been completed and accepted by Routledge, the Poppers sent 
several lists of corrections to London via a painfully slow wartime postal service.27 As Popper 
had predicted about the work’s publication, “it will be a colossal job for everybody concerned. 
It was a colossal job [writing it] here and I was (and am) very ill while doing it.”28 And this is 
to skip over the difficulty that Gombrich had, in the winter and spring of 1943 and 1944, of 
finding a publisher who would commit to a long and dense work by a little-known thinker.29 
But the publishers that rejected The Open Society were not the only ones to take a dim view of 
Popper’s work. When he stepped off the New Zealand Star in England in 1946, to be greeted 
by Gombrich holding the first edition of his book, Karl Popper stepped into an intellectual 
storm of his own making.30 
 
Of course, many thinkers were enormously impressed by Popper’s book. Gilbert Ryle went so 
far as to recommend that “readers should not miss studying the notes collected at the end of 
the two volumes.” 31  In 1950 Bertrand Russell, perhaps the most widely read British 
philosopher of his day, published an essay entitled “Philosophy and Politics” that contains 
spirited attacks on both Plato and Hegel. “That Plato’s Republic should have been admired, on 
its political side, by decent people,” writes Russell, “is perhaps the most astonishing example 
of literary snobbery in all history.” 32  That Russell, a former neo-Hegelian idealist and a 
philosopher–mathematician in the Platonic mould, should have gone so far in his denunciations 
surely owes more to Popper than Russell lets on, although he does mention in passing that the 
anti-Platonic view “has been brilliantly advocated in a recent book by Dr. K. R. Popper.” In a 
footnote, Russell adds: “The same thesis is maintained in my History of Western Philosophy.”33 
Even some of the critics of Popper’s book had some complimentary things to say, although in 
the case of John Plamenatz, who would later succeed Isaiah Berlin as Chichele Professor of 
Social and Political Theory at Oxford, these were limited to a number of backhanded 
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observations, exemplified by the comment that he was “more certain of the ability of the author 
than of the quality of the book.”34 
 
Indeed, for Plamenatz, in his review of The Open Society, it was precisely because “the author 
is a very able man and writes extremely well” that it was so important “that the reviewer 
criticize his book at some length and not too gently.”35 Plamenatz’s eschewal of gentleness is 
on show at various points in his review, as when he says that “both the Socrates and the Plato 
presented to us by Professor Popper are to a considerable extent creatures of his imagination” 
and calls Popper’s overall argument “quite fantastic.”36 Near the end of his piece, Plamenatz 
admitted that he had “mostly found fault with Professor Popper’s book,” but then insisted that 
“that is because, in my opinion, it has many faults.”37 In response, Ernst Gombrich wrote an 
indignant letter of complaint, alleging that Plamenatz had made so many errors of interpretation 
that he failed even to give readers of the British Journal of Sociology an accurate picture of his 
friend’s work. “Instead they are presented with an incoherent selection of mistakes—as it 
happens, however, not of mistakes made by Professor Popper.”38 
 
The heated tone that the discussion of Popper’s book quickly took on may be explained in a 
number of ways. One source of heat was the inflammatory prose in which much of The Open 
Society was itself written. This goes beyond the individual throwaway phrases: the accusation 
that Plato’s literary skill served only to throw a veil over “the complete absence of rational 
arguments”; the dismissal of one of his inferences as “a crude juggle”; even the description of 
the ideal of the philosopher–king as “a monument of human smallness.”39 It might be said, in 
fact, that a polemical tone and a selectiveness with the evidence pervade Popper’s entire 
treatment of Plato. This is a charge that Popper himself not only would have admitted, but 
actually embraced. As he writes in his first chapter on Plato: 
I must . . . warn the reader not to expect a representation of the whole of Plato’s 
philosophy, or what may be called a “fair and just” treatment of Platonism. My attitude 
towards [Plato’s] historicism is one of frank hostility, based upon the conviction that 
historicism is futile, and worse than that. My survey of the historicist features of 
Platonism is therefore strongly critical. Although I admire much in Plato’s philosophy 
. . . I do not take it as my task to add to the countless tributes to his genius.40  
 
But for some readers, this programmatic aggressiveness risked undermining the very criticisms 
to which it was supposed to add vigour. As Gilbert Ryle wrote, 
[Dr. Popper’s] comments . . . have a shrillness which detracts from their force. It is 
right that he should feel passionately. The survival of liberal ideas and liberal practices 
has been and still is in jeopardy. But it is bad tactics in a champion of the freedom of 
thought to use the blackguarding idioms characteristic of its enemies. His verdicts are, 
I think, just, but they would exert a greater influence if they sounded judicial.41  
 
For Popper’s critics, the tone of the book seemed by turns disappointing, puzzling, and 
downright dangerous. John Plamenatz: 
If to argue like [Professor Popper] should ever become a frequent practice among 
writers on serious subjects, all cool and rational discussion would quickly come to an 
end. . . . His manner towards Aristotle is the sort that an unkind man sometimes adopts 
towards someone whom he believes to be his intellectual inferior; and, as is usual in 
such cases, it tells us more about the contemner than the object of his contempt. . . . 
There is here a failure of sympathy . . . on Professor Popper’s part; and he is the poorer 
for it.42  
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But if Popper’s own polemical tone was one reason for the aggressive reaction his book 
received in some quarters, another is the veneration in which Plato was still held at the time 
The Open Society was published. Admittedly, this veneration was far from universal. Popper’s 
association of Plato’s utopian thought experiments with modern European fascism had even 
been anticipated by Reinhold Friedrich “Alfred” Hoernlé, the Bonn-born, Oxford-educated 
thinker who spend the last twenty years of his life in Johannesburg, and whose 1937 
Presidential Address to the University of Witwatersrand asked simply “Would Plato have 
approved of the National-Socialist State?” (The answer, by the way, was “very likely”).43 And 
a few other books and articles, such as those by the US philosophers Warner Fite, Melvin Rader 
and Edward O. Sisson, and by the British Labour politician Richard Crossman, had attacked 
Plato from similar angles, although not with the same intensity of focus, nor with anything like 
the same impact, as Popper’s work would have.44 
 
But if veneration for Plato was hardly universal, it can fairly be said to have been widespread 
in the prewar period, especially in the academy. This was the case not only among logicians 
such as Kurt Gödel, whose Platonism was restricted to a certain way of looking at mathematics, 
but also among classicists and educationalists, who seemed to think that it was in his political 
thought that Plato had made an especially valuable contribution to future ages.45 Among the 
most influential of these educationalists was Richard Livingstone, who served as the President 
of Corpus Christi College, Oxford for almost twenty years, and who was made Vice-Chancellor 
of the University in 1944. In the same year—a year, of course, before the publication of The 
Open Society—Livingstone delivered the Rede Lecture at Cambridge under the title Plato and 
Modern Education.46  In his 1946 work Some Tasks for Education, he would call Plato’s 
Republic “still the greatest of all books on education,” and lament that there was nothing in 
modern educational theory that could compare with it; a statement that may well have been 
true, though we may doubt, as Popper might have, whether this was entirely to the detriment 
of modern educational theory.47 
 
This veneration for Plato might go some way towards explaining, not only the violence of the 
reactions of men like Voegelin to The Open Society, but also their frequent failure to come to 
grips with Popper’s interpretive claims. A reasoned and sustained engagement with Popper’s 
exegesis would eventually come, in Ronald Levinson’s 1953 In Defence of Plato.48 But both 
before and after that volume, many commentators were content simply to dismiss Popper as 
someone whose own political and philosophical views and obvious hostility to Plato made him 
incapable of treating the Athenian writer fairly.49 If we remember the example of men like 
Livingstone, however, it might occur to us that the danger of being overgenerous to Plato was 
just as great as the danger of being excessively critical; and we should in any case remember 
that, as Ryle put it, “hostility is not the only form of partisanship.”50 The philosopher Renford 
Bambrough, in a 1962 paper entitled “Plato’s Modern Friends and Enemies” puts the point 
well: 
Many of Plato’s opponents have done violence to the text from over-zealous concern 
for their views on the main political and philosophical questions, but so have many of 
his defenders, and their whitewash is as disfiguring and distorting as the mud of the 
detractors. . . . It is sometimes mistakenly supposed that only unfavourable criticism 
of an ancient philosopher can be unhistorical, and that all unfavourable criticism of an 
ancient philosopher will be unhistorical.51 
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In other words, no amount of gesturing towards Popper’s own philosophical views is enough 
in itself to knock down his interpretive claims about Plato. This is not, of course, to say that all 
Popper’s claims about Plato in The Open Society are well-founded. So which parts of his 
argument stand up to scrutiny, and which do not? 
 
Naturally enough, some of Popper’s ideas look very dated 70 years after the publication of The 
Open Society. Perhaps the most glaring example of this is Popper’s frequent reliance on the 
idea of tribalism, which plays a number of roles in his book. Philosophically, tribalism is the 
type of the “closed society” with which Popper contrasts his favoured “open society”; 
historically, it is what the Greek polis emerged out of; and in the context of Popper’s exegetical 
programme, it is what Plato wanted to return to.52 “Plato,” we are told, “was longing for the 
lost unity of tribal life,” though the claim is not backed up by any references to the 
philosopher’s writings.53  
 
Moreover, as John Plamenatz pointed out, there is quite a difference between the unquestioning 
acceptance of convention characteristic of Popper’s “tribal society” and the detailed and highly 
theorized planning that is often a feature of totalitarian states. 54  If Plato had a zeal for 
rationalizing, utopian planning, as Popper often claimed, how could he also have wanted to 
bring Athens back into a tribal past?55 For the contemporary reader, there is also the problem 
that the language of tribalism is as discredited in classics as it is in anthropology, at least since 
the French ancient historian Denis Roussel argued convincingly, in 1976, that there simply was 
no tribal stage of Greek civilization.56 There are, then, several reasons to be embarrassed by 
Popper’s statement that “the early Greek tribal society resembles in many respects that of 
peoples like the Polynesians, the Maoris for instance.”57 
 
Popper’s claims about Plato’s desire to return Athens to a tribal stage of development were part 
of his attempt to paint Plato as a “historicist,” and this is a second point on which we might 
take issue with Popper.58 A historicist, to simplify, is someone who believes that the future is 
not open, but fixed; or, to repeat an expression used by Gilbert Ryle, who believes that history 
is “not a bus but a tram.”59 Popper’s arguments against historicism may well be valid and worth 
making; and his reading, in Volume Two of The Open Society, of Hegel and Marx as 
historicists seems difficult to reject.60 The problem for the reader of Volume One is that Plato 
does not make quite as convincing a historicist as Hegel and Marx. As John Plamenatz pointed 
out, though Plato’s dialogues contain occasional speculations about the origins of the polis,  
he does not derive from [them] any general laws governing the development of human 
societies. . . . Whereas [Hegel and Marx] used their philosophies of history either to 
justify the present or to predict the inevitable and imminent coming of the society they 
thought just, Plato did nothing of the kind. His account of the just society derives from 
his conception of the proper life for man to live.61 
 
The distinguished Plato scholar Christopher Taylor has exposed a number of other confusions 
in Popper’s portrait of Plato the historicist.62 For Popper, Plato’s attitude towards political 
change was intimately bound up with his metaphysical Theory of Forms (which held that 
particular objects take their qualities from abstract and eternal entities). In Popper’s view, Plato 
thought that change, since it must take things away from the perfection of the Forms, always 
constituted deterioration.63 That the best state, “the one that resembles the Form or Idea of the 
state most closely” was also “the original or primitive form of society.”64 And moreover, not 
surprisingly, that all changes in political and social arrangements since the original and best 
state have been changes for the worse.65 
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Against this, Taylor points out first that we know from a passage in the Phaedo that things take 
on certain qualities because the Forms come to be in them; when a man becomes just, for 
example, he comes to partake in the Form of justice.66 We can see from this that not all change 
is change away from the Forms; some change brings things closer to some of the Forms. The 
best state may also have been the original and first state, but a passage in the Republic makes 
clear that Plato sees the historical question as of negligible importance compared with the 
theoretical question of what the best state is.67 As for the claim that the whole course of human 
history has been one long deterioration, it is difficult to square with various episodes in Platonic 
mythology, such as the reestablishment of civilization after the flood described in the Laws.68 
Taylor caps his remarks on this point with the observation that “obviously, the reason why the 
ideal state is to remain stable is not that stability is itself the good for a state or even a good at 
all, but because the ideal state is perfect.”69 So much, then, for Plato the historicist.  
 
Popper also received a great deal of criticism, probably justly, for his rather adventurous 
reconstructions of Plato’s psychology and motivations.70 Popper believes that Plato “betrayed” 
his teacher Socrates, manipulating and grossly distorting his heritage to his own ambitious 
ends; that one of Plato’s primary aims in doing philosophy was that of “arresting all political 
change”; and that “the philosopher king is Plato himself, and the Republic is Plato’s own claim 
for kingly power.”71 It was doubtless statements of this sort that led even Gilbert Ryle to 
comment “I think myself that there are limits within which the interpretation of alogical 
motives should be kept and that Dr. Popper is inclined to overstep them.”72 Even though 
connections between Plato’s philosophical writings and more practical political activities are 
certainly not out of the question, most modern classicists would insist that readings of Plato’s 
own motives and aims be more attentive to the often complex structure of his dialogues. 
 
2. Defending Plato 
But if the complex nature of Plato’s dialogues should cause anyone looking for their author’s 
motivations and intentions to pause for thought, it has also been seen as a major obstacle in the 
way of saying anything reliable about Plato’s beliefs. In the decades following Popper’s attack 
on Plato, scholarship outside the UK has moved increasingly away from the midcentury 
orthodoxy which assumed that Plato’s own views could be found in his dialogues, usually in 
the words of “mouthpieces” such as Socrates or the Eleatic Stranger.73 Indeed, Plato’s texts 
have been found to be so irreducibly complex that grave doubts have been raised about the idea 
that the Athenian was writing philosophy at all. 
 
Gerald Press’s review article surveys the various directions in which Plato studies have 
progressed in the decades since the midcentury analytic orthodoxy was challenged. His piece 
also contains a magisterial—not to mention rather intimidating—summary of the many 
arguments that have been levelled against the orthodox approach to Plato. For reasons of space, 
I have had to leave out the impressive array of references with which he supports his catalogue.  
 
With respect to the arguments of Socrates and Plato’s other seeming mouthpieces, the 
assumption that they are Plato’s has been called into question by Platonic anonymity, the lack 
of theoretical justification for taking now Socrates, now someone else to be Plato’s mouthpiece, 
and by showing that it is in general fallacious to take the argument of characters to be those of 
their author. It has been shown, on the other hand, that many fallacious arguments in the 
dialogues, rather than being weaknesses for which Plato ought to be censured, were 
deliberately used by him to achieve other ends. 
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The belief that the dialogues are to be understood as straightforward and serious attempts at 
communicating philosophic doctrine has been challenged by emphasis on the critique of 
writing in the Phaedrus, as well as by an increasing appreciation of the prevalence and 
implications of humour, irony, and play throughout the corpus. Similarly, in contrast with the 
earlier view of Plato as dogmatically opposed to rhetoric, recent scholarship has found that 
important use is made of rhetoric in the dialogues. 
 
In line with much of the preceding, the older assumption that the dialogues are or can be 
interpreted essentially as treatises has been widely criticized on the grounds that it is prima 
facie false, and more specifically that it creates unnecessary interpretive problems, commits 
the intentionalist fallacy, impoverishes interpretations, and renders Plato’s pervasive influence 
unintelligible. In addition, the dialogues exhibit structures characteristic of expressive forms 
very different from treatises; in particular, they have been richly interpreted as dramas. 
Moreover, interpreting the dialogues as if they were treatises written to be read conflicts with 
recent research about the transition from an oral to a literate culture, and about performative 
aspects of the dialogues as we have them.74 
 
In view of the apparently insurmountable obstacles in the way of analysing what scholars once 
referred to as “Plato’s philosophy,” it is no surprise that many Plato scholars in the US and in 
continental Europe have looked for new approaches to the study of the dialogues. In some 
quarters, scholars have simply chosen to focus on the historical context or literary form of the 
dialogues, without necessarily questioning the validity of old-fashioned analytical studies.75 
Others have been more radical, and these more radical readers (or re-readers) of Plato have 
fallen (according to Press) into three main schools.76  
 
The first is the so-called Tübingen School whose most famous contemporary exponent is 
perhaps Thomas Szlezak.77 Tübingen School scholars claim that, in view of the criticisms of 
writing in the Phaedrus and the Seventh Letter, it would be foolish to believe that Plato’s actual 
beliefs are to be found in the written texts he left to posterity. Plato’s actual beliefs can be 
discovered, but only in the “unwritten doctrine” that he left to his students. The real purpose of 
the dialogues we have is not to expound doctrine but to inspire readers to engage in philosophy 
for themselves. The Chicago School (that looks to Leo Strauss as its founder) agrees that only 
a naïve reader would assume that Plato’s own views can be read straight off from the dialogues. 
Plato could never have expressed his antidemocratic views openly in classical Athens; because 
of this, his texts are coded messages for the intelligent interpreter to unpick.78 For proponents 
of the Columbia School (writing in the tradition of Frederick Woodbridge), Plato’s dialogues 
are not meant as philosophy at all; they are best described as dramas, and though they may 
have a vision, they do not have any message.79 
 
How are interpretive issues of this sort relevant to Popper’s attack on Plato? After the sharp 
criticisms of the idea that Plato’s own views can be gleaned through the words of a few of the 
characters in his dialogues, Popper’s straightforward readings of Platonic “doctrine” have come 
to seem naïve. The deemphasizing of the dialogues’ philosophical content at the expense of 
their historical context and literary character makes Popper’s concentration on Plato’s political 
ideas look beside the point. And the shrewd and sophisticated readings of Plato’s texts against 
themselves by the Straussians makes Popper seem, in comparison, rather simpleminded. 
Problems of this sort might now be said to constitute the first line of defence against Popper’s 
attack on Plato. 
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I believe that this line of defence can be overcome, or at least circumvented, but I have neither 
the space nor the ability to deal with all of the issues raised in Press’s formidable catalogue of 
errors here. Instead, I will address only a few of the most influential and commonly-raised 
objections against the orthodox approach to Plato, before moving onto a second, and more 
substantial, line of defence that has been erected against Popper’s assault. 
 
Let us start with so-called “mouthpiece theory,” or what Press goes so far as to refer to as “the 
mouthpiece fallacy.”80 Now, it is clear at the outset that some formulations of this approach 
will be more defensible than others. The view that is sometimes attributed to orthodox readers 
of Plato, that whatever Socrates says in Plato’s dialogues is what Plato thought, is obviously 
absurd; but it is questionable whether this is a view that anyone has ever held. Much more 
promising, and much more reasonable, is the idea that Plato’s own views, with a good deal of 
caution and circumspection, can on many occasions be glimpsed in what Socrates (and a few 
other privileged interlocutors) says in the various dialogues.81 Another way of putting the same 
idea is to say that, although what Socrates says is not always what Plato thought, it is often 
good evidence for what Plato thought.  
 
Teasing apart what Plato has Socrates say in his dialogues, and what Plato actually thought, is 
indeed the whole point of one of the oldest questions in classical studies, the so-called “Socratic 
Problem.”82 The difficulty that Press mentions, of “taking now Socrates, now someone else to 
be Plato’s mouthpiece,” is not as intractable as it sounds, if we make the reasonable supposition 
that Plato eventually became disenchanted with some of the ideas he had been developing, and 
wanted to mark this change in his dialogues by first exposing Socrates to criticism, and then 
by dispensing with him altogether.83  
 
And Press’s statement that “it is in general fallacious to take the argument of characters to be 
those of their author” is much too strong; though he would probably have been right to say that 
“it is often problematic to take the argument of characters to be those of their author.” Of course 
we cannot automatically conclude that what characters say is what their author thought; but at 
the same time, there are occasions when we have good reason to think that certain characters 
have been given special dispensation to speak their authors’ minds. (On rare occasions, we may 
even know for certain that a character’s views are identical to those of their creator: this is the 
case with Philonous in Berkeley’s dialogues, whose views are almost exactly the same as those 
expressed by George Berkeley in his main philosophical treatise.84) 
 
Among the many reasons we might have for suspecting that particular characters are voicing 
views favoured by their author are: the character dominating the conversation, either in terms 
of the length of their speeches, their control of the direction of the dialogue, or the strength of 
their arguments; other characters either agreeing with, or being “defeated” by, them; the 
character’s speech being portrayed as clearly more “philosophical” or “rational” than that of 
other characters.85 Of course, all these things may be true of particular characters without their 
being “mouthpieces” of the author; but it would seem to be the case, at least, that characters of 
this sort tend to express opinions which their authors found unusually interesting, or worth 
discussing.86 And all these things seem to be true of the Platonic character called Socrates.87 
 
The domination of many of Plato’s dialogues by this “Socrates” is one reason why we should 
be cautious about characterizing them as dramas.88 This use of this characterization to raise 
doubts about a link between “Socrates” and Plato seems to go back to Leo Strauss, who opined, 
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as long ago as 1964, that Plato “conceals his opinions,” that the dialogues “must be read like 
dramas,” and that the words of Plato’s characters reflect their author’s views no more than the 
words of Shakespeare’s characters do.89 Views of this sort are often repeated, as they are, for 
example, in an article by James Arieti, first published in 1995: 
I would like to toss out the premise of virtually all work on Plato: that he is writing 
the kind of philosophical work in which the philosopher writes as clearly, as 
straightforwardly, and as soundly as he can. . . . Instead, I should like to assume that 
he is writing works of drama—works whose intention is principally to inspire—and 
that the inspiration in the dialogues is to engagement in a life of the mind, to the doing 
of philosophy with other people, and not with dead or even lively texts. . . .  
 
Surely Plato held positions. The question is whether we can discern those views with 
any certainty in the dialogues. I think we can see hints of some positions through the 
mist of the dialogues, just as we can see hints in the works of Shakespeare, Sophocles, 
and Euripides of what they thought. But it is not easy.90 
 
But there are plenty of ways in which the comparison with Shakespeare is misleading.91 For a 
start, a single character dominates a large number of Plato’s dialogues; this is not the case with 
Shakespeare’s plays.92 Moreover, though characters in Shakespeare often say things that are of 
philosophical interest, they do not engage in systematic philosophical enquiry, either on their 
own or with others.93 But systematic and cooperative philosophical enquiry does not only 
happen repeatedly in Plato’s works—it constitutes the lion’s share of the content of almost all 
of the dialogues.94  
 
The fact that the dialogues consist overwhelmingly of specifically philosophical content limits 
the extent to which we can speak of them as dramas. Of course, they share certain features with 
drama, and we should be ready to learn from studies which explore the relationship between 
Plato’s dialogues and other genres that had a prestigious place in the cultural life of classical 
Athens.95 But this is not quite the same thing as saying that philosophical dialogue “must be 
read” as drama, or that Plato was “writing works of drama.” As Richard Kraut has bluntly 
pointed out, if Plato had wanted to write dramas he could very well have entered plays at the 
Festival of Dionysus.96  
 
To look at the question another way, let us suppose that Plato’s dialogues are meant primarily 
as dramas, and not as works of philosophy. What, exactly, are they supposed to dramatize? If 
they dramatize philosophical conflict and the clash of important personalities in fifth-century 
Athens, it seems odd that characters often change their minds, come to agreement with 
Socrates, and work together towards a greater understanding of various issues.97 If Plato’s 
dialogues dramatize this very cooperation, what is the point of them; if they offer a vision rather 
than a message, what is the content of this vision? Arieti, in the passage quoted above, says 
that the purpose of the dialogues is to inspire us “to the doing of philosophy.” But it would be 
a very strange man who wrote long works aimed solely at inspiring others to do philosophy, 
without taking the prime opportunity presented by the writing of those texts to do some 
philosophy himself.98  
 
Even once it is admitted that Plato’s dialogues tend to have an irreducible (and rather large) 
core of philosophical content, there are plenty of arguments to be had about how exactly we 
should interpret Plato’s philosophy. This is the final argument that I want to discuss in the first, 
methodological line of defence against Popper’s attack on Plato: that the way Popper went 
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about extracting Plato’s views from his dialogues was hopelessly simplistic. And certainly, 
Straussian interpretation is a sophisticated business. But what reason do we have for thinking 
that Plato would have taken the trouble of hiding his views behind the language of his 
dialogues? Strauss seems to have thought that Plato could never have openly expressed his 
dissident opinions about the Athenian democracy in view of the hegemony, ideological and 
otherwise, of that regime.99 And yet, as Kraut and others have pointed out, he regularly does 
so, sometimes quite explicitly.100  
 
In any case, the assumption that Plato’s dialogues do not quite mean what they say, but are 
some sort of coded message, starts us down a perilous interpretative path. It is perilous path in 
this sense: once we start looking beyond the texts themselves for various sorts of hidden 
meanings, it becomes very difficult to find any criteria by which we might judge the various 
sorts of hidden meanings that emerge.101 Elevating certain passages or texts into interpretive 
keys does not help much either, since there always seem to be other passages and texts that 
contradict them, and little reason to privilege one or a few of them over the others.102 In the 
end, there seems no real option other than to do the hard, unglamorous work of interpretation 
using a few, simple and timeworn assumptions as aids: that there was a man called Plato who 
had some more or less consistent ideas that changed to some extent over time, and who 
expressed (or explored) these ideas through philosophical dialogues featuring a small number 
of especially impressive characters. As Kraut concludes, deflatingly but surely correctly: 
Our best chance of understanding Plato is therefore to begin with the assumption that 
in each dialogue he uses his principal interlocutor to support or oppose certain 
conclusions by means of certain arguments because he, Plato, supports or opposes 
those conclusions for those reasons. . . . It is fair to say that this is the approach adopted 
by a great many scholars, and that it has considerably enhanced our understanding of 
the dialogues. This methodological principle is not an a priori assumption about how 
Plato must be read, but is rather a successful working hypothesis suggested by an 
intelligent reading of the text and confirmed by its fruitfulness.103 
 
Given the history of Plato criticism over the last half century, I would be very foolish indeed 
to think that my arguments (mostly borrowed from Kraut) would settle the issue.104 So what 
could we say to the hard-boiled skeptic, who might still insist that Socrates does not speak for 
Plato, Plato was not a philosopher, and that even if he was, he was probably not saying what it 
seems like he is saying? R. M. Hare has given us a clue, by labelling two of the different 
philosophical approaches found in the dialogues—the systematic, doctrine-building approach 
and the questioning, Socratic approach—the work of “Pato” and “Lato” respectively.105 I 
would now like to introduce “Plato”—a fictional character to whom we can attribute the many 
ideas about politics and the ideal state found in the dialogues that come down to us under the 
name of Plato. Because whatever we think of “mouthpiece theory,” of the nature of the Platonic 
dialogue, or about how we should read the ideas in them, the fact remains that there is a set of 
more or less coherent ideas about politics in them, and these ideas have been very influential. 
 
Anyone, then, who has remained unpersuaded by my brief and unsystematic onslaught against 
unorthodox ways of reading Plato is free simply to replace all instances of the word Plato in 
what follows with “Plato.” This will allow us to move on to the second line of defence that has 
been erected against Popper’s attack on Plato: that his reading of the political theory found in 
Plato’s dialogues is wrong. More specifically, Plato’s ideal state was not authoritarian or 
totalitarian, at least not in the sense that Popper claimed it was. And this, of course, must be a 
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central issue in any assessment of Karl Popper’s contribution: is his main charge, that Plato 
was an enemy of the open society, an unfair one? 
 
We should note at the outset the precise content of Popper’s main claim. He says that Plato is 
an enemy of the open society, and calls Plato’s politics “purely totalitarian” and his “Socrates” 
“the embodiment of an unmitigated authoritarianism.”106 What he seems at pains not to do is 
to call Plato either a Nazi or a Fascist.107 Even in the 1950 preface to the second edition, in 
which an emotional link between the events of the war and the writing of the book is strongly 
implied, there is a reminder that “neither the war nor any other contemporary event was 
explicitly mentioned in the book.”108 This is important, since Popper was sometimes lumped 
in with other writers, such as Bertrand Russell or Richard Crossman, who chose to link Plato 
and Hitler more directly.109  
 
In fact, the debate about Plato and contemporary politics that preceded Popper’s intervention 
was more focused on comparisons between Plato’s utopias and twentieth-century fascist 
regimes than it was subsequently, not less. Alfred Hoernlé’s address, for example, presents a 
detailed comparison of the ideal city of the Republic with Nazi Germany. For Hoernlé, the 
differences between the Platonic and the National Socialist ideals are irrelevant; what matters 
is that both regimes have no scruples about imposing these ideals coercively, and indoctrinating 
younger generations in them. 110  And Hoernlé bolstered his claims about the similarity of 
Kallipolis and the Third Reich by referring to a number of books written by Germans 
sympathetic to the Nazi cause that explicitly appealed to Plato’s writings.111  
 
Indeed, appeals of this sort were so common that the British philosopher H. B. Acton could 
state, matter-of-factly, in 1938, “In Germany the claim is sometimes made that National 
Socialism incorporates the best of Plato’s political theory.”112 The fact that actual National 
Socialists (even learned ones) really did claim the support of Plato’s theories is important, since 
it shows that Popper’s way of attacking contemporary totalitarianism—by criticizing an ancient 
thinker—was less unexpected or unjustified than it might now seem. And the claim that Plato 
was some sort of proto-fascist was hardly an absurd one in itself. Even Acton, who disagreed 
with it, admitted that “whereas it would be merely laughable to claim that Jesus or Kant were 
exponents of the fascist philosophy, there is no such glaring incongruity with respect to 
Plato.”113 
 
Nonetheless, there were some serious problems with the strong thesis that Plato would have 
been quite happy in 1930s Germany. For Acton, the main hallmarks of fascism were 
irrationalism and relativism, two ideas which are “wholly lacking from Plato’s thought”; 
besides this, the fascist worship of war for its own sake is explicitly contradicted by a passage 
in Plato’s Laws, where war is said to be not an intrinsic good, but a necessary evil.114 For G. 
R. Morrow, an expert on the Laws, the Plato that emerges both from that text and from the 
Seventh Letter is a thinker whose main concern is to defend the rule of law against the arbitrary 
whims of a tyrant (or, as readers in 1941 might have inferred, of a Führer).115 For the English 
Platonist G. C. Field, the key point was that “a critic of democracy is not necessarily a Nazi or 
a Fascist, and the defenders of democracy would be very ill-advised to dismiss reasoned 
criticism of it by a simple reference to one or other of these contemporary views.”116 
 
It would be difficult for anyone perusing the pre-Popper debate about Plato’s politics to deny 
the judiciousness of Field’s advice. Acton, Morrow, and Field probably had the best of their 
argument with the likes of Hoernlé, Crossman, Fite, and Rader, and this is very likely due to 
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the simple fact that the claim that Plato was a Fascist, or Hitler a Platonist, was overambitious. 
In striving to find detailed similarities—even, in some cases, identity—between an ancient 
thought experiment and a modern regime, Plato’s prewar critics exposed their arguments to 
refutation and falsification on a whole range of fronts. This might explain why Popper took 
care to shield his own critique of Plato from the same types of counterattack. Instead, he 
presented ancient and modern totalitarianism as in the same intellectual “tradition”—a tradition 
in which Plato happened to be an important early figure.117  
 
Popper, then, did not present Plato as a Fascist or a Nazi, so any justifiable doubts that we 
might have about that claim need not affect our assessment of his Open Society.118 At the same 
time, he did present Plato as having developed certain ideas which undergirded contemporary 
totalitarianism. And, given his reference to Plato’s thought as “unmitigated authoritarianism,” 
and his description of it as “purely totalitarian,” it would seem that Popper thought of Plato as 
a totalitarian of a relatively extreme kind. How defensible is this characterization? And how 
much should the precise flavour or temperature of Plato’s authoritarianism matter? 
 
The question of exactly what type of totalitarian Plato was is the subject of Christopher Taylor’s 
careful analysis. For Taylor, there are several varieties of totalitarianism. In the most extreme 
kind, “the purposes and well-being of individuals are totally subordinated to those of the 
state.”119 In the most moderate sort of totalitarianism, “the function and aim of the state is 
simply to promote the welfare of its citizens.”120 At the same time, the different varieties of 
totalitarianism are united by an authoritarian decision-making structure and an ideology that 
pervades all aspects of life.121  
 
Taylor makes a persuasive case both that Popper presented Plato as an extreme totalitarian, and 
that he was wrong to do so—in other words, that Plato’s utopias fulfil the conditions for only 
the most moderate type of totalitarianism. On the first point, we have a number of statements 
by Popper that encourage us to think that for Plato, “The criterion of morality is the interest of 
the state.”122 On the second point, there are a number of considerations that make clear that 
Plato’s ideal city, both in the Republic and the Laws, is one in which the state is judged to be 
good insofar as it helps its citizens flourish, and not the other way around.  
 
As Taylor points out, one of Socrates’ main endeavours in the Republic is to demonstrate that 
justice is in itself of value to the person who possesses it, irrespective of what use a person’s 
being just may be to anyone else.123 But if Plato were a totalitarian of the most extreme sort, 
he would surely want to insist that a citizen’s being just was only worthwhile insofar as this 
condition fostered some interest of the state. This he does not do; on the contrary, he tells us 
that justice for the individual is a harmonious soul; that justice is like health, an intrinsic good 
to its possessor; and that the just man, whose soul is truly in harmony, enjoys the best sort of 
pleasures.124 A just soul may help us in constructing the just state, but there are plenty of 
reasons to desire the former other than to get us closer to the latter.125 
 
As for the Laws, for Taylor there is only one passage that comes close to suggesting the 
subordination of individual ends to the ends of the state, and in his quotation of it Popper 
commits an important sin of omission.126 In this passage, in Popper’s translation, the Athenian 
Stranger tells us that in the best state, 
Everything possible has been done to eradicate from our life everywhere and in every 
way all that is private and individual. . . . Our very eyes and ears and hands seem to 
see, to hear, and to act, as if they belonged not to individuals but to the community. 
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All men are moulded to be unanimous in the utmost degree in bestowing praise and 
blame, and they even rejoice and grieve about the same things, and at the same time. 
And all the laws are perfected for unifying the city to the utmost.127  
 
Taylor does not dispute the translation. But he points out a sentence that Popper does not quote 
in its entirety, which runs (in Taylor’s rendering): 
That sort of city, whether inhabited by gods or several children of gods [is such that] 
in living that sort of life, they inhabit it euphrainomenoi, i.e. enjoying themselves.128  
 
Taylor concludes that by omitting some of this sentence, Popper conveys “the entirely false 
impression that in this passage Plato advocates the suppression of individuality for a collective 
good, when he quite plainly . . . says that the suppression of individuality brings the pleasantest 
life for the individual.”129 
 
Taylor’s arguments are well taken and well supported by evidence from Plato’s texts. We 
should probably agree with him that Plato is not the extreme totalitarian that Popper presents 
us with. On the other hand, it is worth noticing that Taylor begins his article by accepting that 
“the ideal state of the Republic is a totalitarian state,” and even “an instance of extreme 
authoritarianism” (though it is not, as we have seen, an instance of extreme totalitarianism).130 
This kind of admission is surprisingly common in the writings of Plato’s defenders.  
 
H. B. Acton goes so far as to state, in the first paragraph of his article, that “no one would deny 
a strong likeness between some details of Plato’s teaching and some details of fascism” (my 
emphasis); “the question,” for Acton, was “whether these likenesses are merely accidental, or 
are due to some deep-seated similarity of outlook.” 131  G. C. Field similarly, but more 
moderately, admits at the outset that the charge that Plato “was not a democrat, and disbelieved 
in democracy” was “certainly true”; what Field went on to question was not the idea that Plato 
disliked democracy, but the assumption that this “was necessarily a sign of mental 
depravity.”132 
 
Now, in making these admissions, Plato’s apologists clearly hoped to demonstrate a certain 
scholarly moderation, a levelheadedness that they found to be dismayingly absent in the 
writings of many of Plato’s critics. And perhaps they succeeded. Nonetheless, their admissions 
seem to me to give away rather a lot. In particular, it strikes me that Karl Popper himself would 
have been quite happy with the statement that Plato, though an authoritarian and even a 
totalitarian, was not an extreme totalitarian. An acceptance that Plato’s philosophy bore some 
resemblance to fascism would have been more than he was hoping for; but he probably would 
not have been terribly upset with it. And Popper was ready to argue the merits of democracy 
against its doubters.133 But one of the main purposes of Volume 1 of Popper’s book was to 
show that Plato was hostile to the open society, and this is a claim that very few of Popper’s 
critics have even contested.134 
 
Of course, for the scholar of Plato, and for those interested in Greek political thought more 
generally, it is important to determine exactly what sort of antidemocratic or authoritarian ideas 
Plato was espousing. And in assessing the quality of the exegetical work of Karl Popper, it is 
obviously helpful to have an idea of how accurate his description of Plato’s views was. When 
it comes to judgments about Popper’s impact, though, his exaggerations and excesses might 
need to be seen in a different light. Because it may well be that Popper’s most important 
contribution was bursting the bubble of the complacent Plato worship that had been carried out 
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for decades by men such as Livingstone. And in bursting that bubble, a little sharpness may 
have been all to the good. So leaving aside now the correctness of Popper’s precise claims, let 
us try to reach a few conclusions about his impact on the way we think about Plato.  
 
3. Popper’s Contribution—And what he Missed 
As I have just suggested, Popper’s greatest contribution was to problematize the reception of 
Plato’s political philosophy, and in particular the political philosophy contained in the 
Republic. Popper certainly did not convince everyone of all the details of his case, as we have 
seen; and, as we have seen, his arguments against Plato contain a number of confusions and 
misapprehensions. But his attack was successful in rebalancing the conversation about Plato’s 
politics both inside and outside of the academy. After Popper, it would no longer be possible 
to claim, as Field did in 1944, that “the very idea of labelling and dismissing the arguments of 
a great thinker as just ‘right’ or ‘wrong’” was “a mark of superficial thinking.”135 (Of course, 
it is hard to see how thinkers come to be called “great” if it is not through readers examining 
their arguments and considering whether they strike them as true or not.) And it would seem 
increasingly difficult to argue, as men such as Richard Livingstone did, that what justified 
Plato’s central place in our education system was the positive value—rather than the pedagogic 
usefulness—of his ideas.136 
 
Indeed, we have learned from Gerald Press that it is to the years following the Second World 
War that we should date the beginning of the revolution in Plato studies whose effects are still 
very much noticeable today.137 And I would like to propose that this revolution was motivated 
and driven forward partly by the need to find new and better reasons for the continued study 
of Plato. The need for new reasons had come about, quite obviously, because the old reasons 
for studying Plato had been discredited. It was difficult to hold the Republic up as a model for 
future policy makers after so much damage had been done by regimes which seemed to echo 
many of its fundamental principles. And Karl Popper, with his mixture of scholarship and 
invective, played a key role in driving that message home. 
 
If I am right that the postwar revolution in Platonic studies was partly a response to the head-
on attack on Plato’s politics that had been carried out by Popper and others, this might also go 
some way towards explaining the precise course (or courses) that the antianalytic revolution 
took. Popper’s attack was focused overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, on the Republic; and 
postwar research moved increasingly to deemphasize that work, which had previously stood 
virtually unchallenged as Plato’s “masterpiece.”138 The Laws (whose ideal city of Magnesia is 
usually seen as less authoritarian than the Republic’s Kallipolis) became an increasingly 
popular subject of analysis, and its status vis-à-vis other Platonic dialogues rose steadily.139 
But dialogues that had little at all to say about politics, such as the Symposium and the 
Phaedrus, though they had never been ignored, also seemed to grow in popularity and 
importance.140  
 
Along with this shift towards the more literary dialogues came the shift towards more literary 
ways of reading Plato that we have already discussed. This, of course, was not entirely an 
attempt to escape the force of the argument against Plato’s politics; scholars who joined in this 
movement had perfectly respectable interpretive reasons for doing so. And yet it is, at the very 
least, suggestive that this shift took place soon after the debate on Plato’s politics had erupted. 
I could make similar points about the eagerness, common to many schools of Plato studies, to 
deny that the words of “Socrates” had anything much to do with the thoughts of Plato, that 
Plato was doing philosophy at all, and that Plato’s dialogues were intended as a clear exposition 
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of some ideas that their author found worth examining. Some denials of this kind might be 
found in earlier works, but they certainly became more frequent, and more heated, after the 
1950s. 
 
We may, then, owe the revolution in Platonic studies of the last half century partly to the 
forthrightness of Popper’s attack. At the same time, though, we should remember that Popper, 
in contrast to some of predecessors, took great care to avoid calling Plato a Fascist or a Nazi—
indeed, he seems to have avoided using those words at all. This, surprisingly, may count as 
another of Popper’s key contributions. Despite the emotional tone of his argument, and despite 
its many extravagances, Popper’s central claim about Plato—that he had totalitarian ideas—is 
less ambitious, and more moderate, than the accusations of men like Hoernlé. Popper wisely 
did not seek to prove point-to-point correspondences between Plato’s ideal states and 
contemporary regimes. Moreover, his contempt for Plato’s weaker arguments was tempered 
by (or at least combined with) a respect for what he referred to as the Athenian philosopher’s 
“overwhelming intellectual achievement.”141 
 
In his 1944 article, Field stated that “anyone who thinks that it is impossible to learn valuable 
lessons from the arguments of [a great] thinker, even when he disagrees with him, is displaying 
a sad lack of capacity for philosophical thought.”142 The point might strike us as both true and 
important; but it seems clear that it would not apply to Karl Popper. Popper changed the case 
against Plato from the accusation that the philosopher was a kind of fascist, to the allegation 
that he had an important role in an intellectual tradition which, many centuries later, played a 
part in bringing fascism into being.  
 
As Popper wrote in the preface to the second edition, though the book made no mention of the 
war, “it was an attempt to understand those events and their background.”143 This echoed the 
statement in the introduction that the book “tries to contribute to our understanding of 
totalitarianism.”144 At least in his own eyes, Popper’s focus was on understanding Plato. True, 
he sought to understand Plato mainly because he saw him as an enemy of the open society; but 
the reason he devoted a whole volume to Plato was because he saw the Athenian as not just 
another critic of democracy, but as an especially powerful and influential one, and therefore 
one that was particularly worth understanding and responding to.  
 
There is one final way in which Popper moved the debate away from contemporary regimes 
and towards the intellectual foundations of authoritarianism. The prewar attack on Plato had 
mainly accused him of being a sort of fascist. The attacks often came from men of the left, such 
as Richard Crossman; and Plato’s defenders were often men, like G. C. Field, who found 
nothing unusual or surprising in criticisms of democracy. Field himself suggested that “a good 
deal” of the recent criticism of Plato had come from “those who have been influenced by or 
are sympathetic towards the doctrine of Marxian Communism.” And he recommended “that 
they try . . . changing their line of approach to Plato, and presenting him as a forerunner of 
Marx.”145 
 
Now, Field’s recommendation was very likely neither sincere nor well intentioned. It was 
almost certainly meant as an ironic comment on the anti-Platonists’ position: here they were 
calling Plato’s politics fascist, when it was probably just as close to communism, a creed to 
which many of them were sympathetic! Nonetheless, it is arguable that Karl Popper called 
Field’s bluff by taking up his challenge of associating Plato as much with communism as 
fascism.146  
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He also went further, pairing Plato and Marx as the two most dangerous enemies of the open 
society in the two volumes of his work.147 Even in 1945, Popper was as concerned with the 
rising influence of the Soviets as he was with the waning power of the Nazis.148 But the Plato 
and Marx that emerge from his work are not a right wing and a left wing critic of democracy, 
but two philosophers who shared ideas that, time and time again, would be taken up by 
opponents of the open society.149 Popper seemed keen to make clear to potential readers of the 
Open Society that it was not a partisan work; hence his refusal to accept his friend Friedrich 
Hayek’s offer to write a preface for the work “because it would brand the book and myself.”150 
 
If Popper encouraged us to see Plato as an absolutist first and foremost, and not as a right wing 
absolutist, I want to turn finally to what I think Popper missed in his critique of Plato, the 
enemy of democracy. To put it in a nutshell, what I think Popper missed in his critique of Plato 
was ancient democracy. Popper took it as his main task to identify and criticize what he saw as 
the totalitarian tendency in Plato’s thought, and he did that job well (if far from perfectly). But 
he largely ignored the positive example of the particular democracy that had roused Plato’s 
critical ire—the direct democracy of the classical Athenians.  
 
Indeed, when Popper speaks of the open society he is referring, first and foremost, to a sort of 
liberalism. At one point, he defines the open society simply as “the society in which individuals 
are confronted with personal decisions.”151 Individual freedom is thus the hallmark of Popper’s 
ideal city. Democracy is a secondary concern, though if we look carefully we can see that 
liberalism and democracy are in fact linked in Popper’s system. They are linked because in the 
open society, in contrast to tribal society, people realize that social and political arrangements 
are not natural but conventional. To ignore convention on a personal level would be an exercise 
of personal liberty; to change convention on a societal scale would be an act of democratic will. 
 
But when we look at what Popper has to say about democracy (which is any case relatively 
little compared to what he has to say about the open society) we find that his conception of 
popular rule is rather minimalist. 152  Popper’s account of democracy bears some striking 
similarities to the elitist theory of another Austrian émigré, Joseph Schumpeter, that had found 
an influential expression in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, a book published only 
three years before the Open Society. For Schumpeter, ordinary people are too ignorant to play 
a part in politics; the point of democracy is simply to allow them to choose between competing 
members of the elite.153 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, Popper agreed. Democracy is simply the type of government “of which 
we can get rid without bloodshed.”154 And this is all we can expect, since “although ‘the 
people’ may influence the actions of their rulers by the threat of dismissal, they never rule 
themselves in any concrete, practical sense.”155 In line with this, institutions such as elections 
are not, for Popper, ways of allowing the people to rule, but nothing more than “reasonably 
effective institutional safeguards against tyranny.”156  
 
Now, this conception of democracy is hardly an absurd one. But it is strikingly distant from 
the democratic polity that Plato was taking aim at in his dialogues. Most scholars would now 
accept that the Athenian dēmos or people did not limit itself to choosing leaders; instead, the 
people themselves both made and enacted state policy through various participatory institutions 
such as the Assembly, the randomly selected Council, and the people’s courts.157 In Popper’s 
view, democracy does not require the active participation of the people, but only their passive 
imprimatur. But as G. C. Field pointed out, “one of the cardinal virtues” of the Republic’s 
20 
Journal of New Zealand Studies NS28 (2019), 2-28 https://doi.org/10.26686/jnzs.v0iNS28.5418 
 
 
Kallipolis is precisely the “general agreement throughout the city” as to who should “do the 
actual work of governing.”158 If Field is right, Popper’s own vision of democracy may be closer 
to the ideal of the man he was criticizing than it is to the polity we might have expected him to 
be defending! 
 
In fact, it is far from certain that Plato would have disliked modern representative democracies 
quite as violently as he disliked ancient direct democracy. 159 This is partly because a key 
element in his political theory—one that Popper underplays—is the idea that politics should be 
undertaken by political experts. I cannot provide a full analysis of this feature of Plato’s 
thinking, but I will quote a few excerpts from the Statesman, which together offer as clear an 
encapsulation of it as I know of. With regard to political authority, the Eleatic Stranger says, 
“the criterion in these things must not be the few, nor the many, nor consent nor the lack of it, 
nor poverty nor wealth, but some kind of knowledge (epistēmē).”160 He goes on to note that 
such knowledge cannot be found in the mass of the people, but should only be sought in “some 
one man, or two, or extremely few.”161  
 
Rather disturbingly, Popper’s theory of democracy is not a world away from being able to 
incorporate the Platonic perspective on political expertise. If democracy has nothing to do with 
popular participation in politics, but only requires that the people can choose elite leaders, why 
should these elite leaders not be experts? But as Field points out, “we have made a considerable 
concession” to Plato as soon as “we have accepted the view that a large part of the work of 
government really does demand a degree of special knowledge and concentrated attention 
which cannot be possible for the great majority of the population.”162  
 
Popper’s failure to counter one of the central thrusts of the Platonic attack on democracy 
represents, I would argue, a major missed opportunity. There are two possible responses to this 
challenge that Popper might have made; to be fair to him, neither of them would have been a 
particularly easy argument to make at the time when he was writing, but both responses might 
have been attempted. The first response draws on the example of Athenian democracy, and the 
second on political science and political theory. Both arguments are crucial today, with the 
example of an apparently successful and technocratic China looming in the background.163 
 
Popper of course had available to him the basic facts about Athenian government and society. 
He might, then, have used classical Athens as an example of how a direct democratic society 
can indeed compete with autocratic and oligarchic rivals with some success. That he did not 
was no doubt partly due to the hold of traditional historiography, which cherry-picked certain 
episodes (such as the destruction of the Sicilian expedition) to suggest that the classical 
Athenian state performed badly.164 More recently, scholars have shown that, over the long 
term, and across a range of measures, democratic Athens emerges as one of the most successful 
of the Greek poleis.165 This may have been to some extent a result of the democratic system; 
even if it was not, Athens’s example demonstrates clearly that the notion that any viable state 
has to be run solely by experts is wrong.  
 
Popper might also have made the more general, and more ambitious argument that Plato’s 
emphasis on expert leaders was misplaced. Here a number of paths were open to him. He might 
have developed the intuition of Socrates’s rival in Plato’s Protagoras that politics simply is not 
a field of expertise in the way that ship building, for example, is—it involves moral judgments, 
and when it comes to moral judgments there are no real experts.166 He might have pointed out 
that the distinction between the rule of the masses and the rule of experts presents us with a 
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false dichotomy, since democracies regularly incorporate expert knowledge in a way that 
remains consistent with popular rule.  
 
And he might have argued that, given the right conditions, large groups of citizens working 
together are in fact not inferior in solving various sorts of problems to small groups of experts. 
But this last argument has only started to seem plausible in recent years, partly because of real 
world experiments in mass collaboration, and in part because of pioneering research into 
collective decision-making.167 
 
Whatever opportunities were missed in Popper’s Open Society, it is becoming increasingly 
clear with every year that passes that the work will outlive the controversy it caused in the 
middle of the twentieth century. Written by an Austrian Jew who fled Hitler to find a temporary 
refuge in New Zealand, it was attacked and praised in equal measure by some of the leading 
intellectual lights of the day. The book certainly has its flaws—Athens was never tribal, Plato 
was never a historicist, and there is no evidence he ever dreamed of being a philosopher–king. 
But the force and focus of Popper’s arguments changed the way we think about Plato, 
encouraging debate rather than worship, but also moderating and intellectualizing the 
controversy over Plato’s totalitarianism. Popper went too far in presenting Plato as an extreme 
totalitarian, but the thesis that Plato’s dialogues contain authoritarian ideas has yet to be refuted. 
 
This, of course, is to bracket interpretive objections that—I have proposed—were motivated 
partly by a desire to shield Plato from the direct force of Popper’s attack. I have discussed these 
issues already at length. But I will make one further comment on this point before the end of 
this essay. In deemphasizing Plato the historical figure, Plato the philosopher, and Plato’s 
specifically political philosophy, we are at risk not only of making interpretive errors, but of 
not according Plato’s ideas the respect they deserve. In my opinion, it is all to the good that 
Platonic scholarship, with the work of Richard Kraut and others, is now moving back towards 
an approach that, while acknowledging Plato as a literary artist, also takes him seriously as a 
political philosopher. In this, I would argue, contemporary Plato scholars are following the 
example of Karl Popper, whose head-on assault always implied a measure of respect for his 
Greek predecessor as perhaps the most formidable theorist of absolutism. As Plamenatz 
perceived:  
Professor Popper is himself, in his own peculiar way, an admirer of Plato; his attack 
on him is too vehement and very probably unjust, but it is neither petty nor mean; he 
has felt the greatness of Plato, and has been under his spell.  
 
As someone who has also, at times, been under the philosopher’s spell, I want to close this 
paper by emphasizing that recognizing that Plato’s dialogues contain a great deal of ideal 
political theory need not mean ignoring the fact that they also contain many other things as 
well; nor does a forthright rejection of Plato’s autocratic politics necessarily entail a rejection 
of Plato’s views on other subjects. As someone who regularly uses Plato in my teaching, I am 
acutely aware of the literary beauty and argumentative ingenuity of his texts, as well as of their 
usefulness as a way in to the glittering intellectual life of fifth-century Athens. At the same 
time, I am glad that, partly because of the influence of the Open Society, the study of Plato has 
reached a stage in which uncritical veneration is a thing of the distant past. Just as I am sure 
that literary readings of the dialogues will continue to be produced, it is my sincere hope—and 
not just for professional reasons—that the argument about Plato’s politics has a long future 
ahead of it. But this is partly because, since the Second World War, that argument has been 
conducted on a more or less equal footing. And it is in this modest yet significant sense that 
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Karl Popper, during his time in New Zealand, can truly be said to have broken the spell of 
Plato.  
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